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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article deals with the regulation of discharges of waste in storm 
water from municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s).1  In the last 
few years, significant regulatory action has occurred in this area, 
especially in California.  The permitting of MS4s has generated political 
controversy in the regulated community, which has bubbled over into 
legal challenges.2 
Although some legal questions have been settled by the courts, the 
 
 1. An MS4 is defined broadly by the federal regulations as “a conveyance or 
system of conveyances (including roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, catch 
basins, curbs, gutters, ditches, manmade channels, or storm drains)” owned or operated 
by a state, city, town, or other public body having jurisdiction over the disposal of storm 
water.  Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2002).  Note that this 
definition of an MS4 is not limited to municipally owned storm sewer systems. 
Municipal storm water federal regulations are being implemented in two phases, 
depending on the classification of the municipality as “large,” “medium,” or “small.”  
The phase I regulations apply to large communities with populations of 250,000 or more 
and medium communities with populations of 100,000 or more people.  40 C.F.R. § 
122.26(b)(4), (b)(7).  These regulations were issued by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) on November 16, 1990.  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 
47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122–24).  The EPA subsequently 
issued amended regulations on March 21, 1991.  National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges; 
Application Deadline for Group Applications, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,098 (Mar. 21, 1991) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).  The phase II regulations were published as final rules 
on December 8, 1999 and became effective on February 7, 2000.  National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control 
Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–24).  They cover “regulated small” MS4s located in 
smaller urbanized areas that are not regulated by phase I, including military bases.  40 
C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(16).  Phase II regulation covers more than municipal systems.  Storm 
water systems on military bases, large hospitals, prison complexes, school districts, 
colleges, highways, and other thoroughfares are also covered.  Id.  Operators of 
“regulated small” MS4s are required to obtain permit coverage by March 10, 2003.  
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the 
Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
68,722.  This two-phased approach allows permitting authorities to initially focus on 
those municipalities with the most serious storm water problems.  See Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. 
EPA, No. 00-70014, 2003 WL 113486 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003) (generally affirming the 
phase II rules against statutory, administrative, and constitutional challenges, but 
remanding to correct procedural defects in the general permit program). 
 2. Although the focus of this Article is on California law, storm water legal 
challenges are occurring outside California.  See, e.g., Judgment of Dismissal, Tualatin 
Riverkeepers v. Browner (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-793 BR), noted in Alexandra Dapolito 
Dunn, Municipal Storm Water Permits—Why Numeric Limits Don’t Fit, WATER 
QUALITY & WETLANDS COMMITTEE NEWSL., Dec. 2001, at 4, 5; Miss. River Revival, Inc. 
v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, No. C1-01-23, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 855 (Minn. 
Ct. App. July 31, 2001); City of Irving, Texas, Mun. Separate Storm Sewer Sys., No. 00-
18 (E.A.B., July 16, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/disk11/irving.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2003). 
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situation is dynamic.  At the federal level there have been two notable 
storm water decisions, Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner and 
Environmental Defense Center v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency.3  There have been two administrative decisions issued by the 
State Water Resources Control Board.4  Petitions to the State Water 
Resources Control Board challenging the Los Angeles, Orange County, 
and Santa Ana storm water permits have been filed and are pending 
resolution.5  In late 2001, a lawsuit was filed by the Building Industry 
Association challenging the San Diego MS4 permit6 and requesting a writ 
of mandate to set it aside.  In mid-2002, the California Court of Appeal for 
the Sixth District decided Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of 
Salinas,7 in which the city’s storm drainage fee was held invalid for failing 
to comply with the voter approval requirements of proposition 218.  
Additional administrative and judicial legal challenges to these and other 
storm water permits are likely in the future. 
 
 3. Defenders of Wildlife, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that municipal 
storm-sewer discharge permits are not required to comply with state water-quality 
standards, but the EPA has discretion to impose such standards); Envtl. Def. Ctr., 2003 
WL 113486. 
 4. In re Cities of Bellflower, SWRCB Order WQ 2000-11, 2000 WL 33158724 
(Oct. 5, 2000); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 
SWRCB Order 2001-15 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/w 
qorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Petition of County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Flood 
Control Discharge, Los Angeles Region, Jan. 11, 2003, SWRCB/OCC File No. A-1448 
(on file with author); Petition of Los Angeles County Economic Development 
Corporation, City of Lake Forest, City of Los Alamitos, City of Stanton, Santa Ana 
Region, Jan. 18, 2002, SWRCB/OCC File No. A-1463(a) (on file with author); Petition 
of Mission Viejo, San Diego Region, Feb. 13, 2002, SWRCB/OCC File No. A-1465(c) 
(on file with author).    
 6. State Respondents’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Complaint/Petition for Writ of Mandate, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v. 
State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Super. Ct. 2003) (No. GIC 780263).  The San Diego 
storm water permit is “area-wide.”  It applies to the following cities: Carlsbad, Chula 
Vista, Coronado, Del Mar, El Cajon, Encinitas, Escondido, Imperial Beach, La Mesa, 
Lemon Grove, National City, Oceanside, Poway, San Diego, San Marcos, Santee, Solana 
Beach, and Vista.  It also includes the County of San Diego and the San Diego Unified 
Port District.  California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Waste Discharge 
Requirements for Discharges of Urban Runoff from the Municipal Separate Storm Sewer 
Systems (MS4s) Draining the Watersheds of the County of San Diego, the Incorporated 
Cities of San Diego, and the San Diego Port District, Order No. 2001-01, at 1 (Feb. 21, 
2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/programs/sd_stormwater.html 
[hereinafter Order No. 2001-01]. 
 7. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 
5938 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002).   
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Predictably, public policy decisionmakers and attorneys practicing 
environmental and land use law will be swept up in the controversy 
surrounding the subject of municipal storm water regulation.  The stakes 
are high.  The goal of this Article is to provide a framework for 
understanding some of the emerging legal issues. 
II.  THE FEDERAL-STATE STRUCTURE  
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more commonly referred to 
as the Clean Water Act (CWA), is based on Congress’s authority under 
the Commerce Clause “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”8  It is premised on the 
realization that the protection of aquatic resources necessitated broad 
authority to control water pollution and that the discharge of pollutants 
be controlled at the source.9 
The CWA generally uses two different regulatory approaches or 
philosophies to control water pollution.  The predominant regulatory 
strategy is based on controlling the discharge of pollutants through the 
use of effluent limits, which are set in uniform, technology-based 
terms.10 Dischargers are legally authorized to release pollutants11 to 
waters of the United States pursuant to the effluent limits contained in 
their permit.  The other approach focuses on regulating dischargers 
based on their impact to the receiving water quality.  Discharge limits 
are set in terms of the amount of pollution allowed in a defined water 
body or water body segment with consideration given to local 
conditions, such as the beneficial uses of the receiving water and its 
assimilative pollutant capacity.12 
The starting point to understanding the storm water regulation is the 
CWA.  It is the principal federal statute dealing with water pollution, 
including MS4 storm water permitting.13  The CWA consists of a 
number of general programs, including the National Pollutant Discharge 
 
 8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 9. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. 
 10. JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 608 (1999). 
 11. The term “pollutant” includes sewage, chemical wastes, biological 
materials, heat, industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste.  33 U.S.C. § 1362 
(2000).  The term “pollution” is broadly defined to mean “the man-made or man-
induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of 
water.”  Id. 
 12.  OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE 
USER’S GUIDE 295–308 (2d ed. 2001). 
 13. The basic structure of the CWA was established in 1972.  It has been subjected 
to several significant sets of amendments since then.  Important changes were made to 
the CWA in 1977, 1987, and 1990.  Id. at 295–96. 
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Elimination System (NPDES) point source program,14 the pretreatment 
program applicable to indirect dischargers,15 the nonpoint source (NPS) 
program,16 the dredge and fill program,17 and the oil spill program.18 
Municipal storm water regulation is part of the NPDES permit 
program, although it also seeks to deal with some of the problems 
common to NPS pollution.  In 1987, Congress added section 402(p) to 
the CWA.19  Congress directed that storm water discharges be regulated 
as “point sources”20 and then established a framework for issuing 
permits.21 
Section 402(p)(3)(B) is the controlling federal statutory provision for 
municipal storm water discharges.  The statute establishes the following 
federal permit requirements for municipal storm water discharges: 
 Permits for discharges from municipal storm sewers— 
 (i) may be issued on a system- or jurisdiction-wide basis; 
 (ii)shall include a requirement to effectively prohibit non-stormwater 
discharges into the storm sewers; and 
 (iii)shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the 
maximum extent practicable [MEP], including management practices, 
 
 14. Clean Water Act, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 
1342 (2000). 
 15. Clean Water Act, § 307(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (2000) (pretreatment effluent 
standards). 
 16. Clean Water Act, §§ 208, 319, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329 (area-wide waste 
treatment management; NPS management programs). 
 17. Clean Water Act, § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (dredge and fill). 
 18. Clean Water Act, § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000) (oil spill program). 
 19. Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 405, 101 Stat. 7, 69–71 (1987).  See also National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm 
Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,991–92 (Nov. 16, 1990) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 122–24).  Section 402(p) requires permits to be obtained for the following 
types of storm water discharges: those associated with industrial activities, those from 
municipal storm sewer systems serving populations over 100,000, discharges with 
respect to which a permit had been issued prior to 1987, and any discharge determined 
by the permitting authority to be contributing to a violation of water quality standards or 
a significant source of pollutants to waters of the United States.  National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water 
Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. at 47,992. 
 20. The CWA defines a point source as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance,” including such physical structures as pipes or ditches.  Clean Water Act, § 
502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000). 
 21. The CWA also regulates industrial storm water discharges under the NPDES 
program.  See Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A).  Federal regulations 
identify eleven categories of industry that are covered, including construction activities 
where the construction disturbs five acres or more.  See Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the EPA’s decision to regulate 
construction sites only over five acres is arbitrary and capricious). 
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control techniques and system, design and engineering methods, and such 
other provisions as the Administrator or the State determines appropriate for 
the control of such pollutants.22 
Since 1987, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
promulgated regulations governing storm water discharges. They are 
contained primarily in 40 C.F.R. § 122.26,23 with additional references 
in Parts 122, 123, and 124.  As would be expected, these regulations add 
considerable implementing detail to the statutory mandate found in 
section 402(p).  
Although MS4 permits are NPDES permits, they differ considerably 
from the technology-based treatment standards and numeric effluent 
criteria associated with “end-of-pipe” discharges.24  The rationale for 
treating storm water discharges differently from traditional end-of-pipe 
discharges is based on the variability of storm water discharge.  Storm 
water is highly variable, both as to flow and as to pollutant type and 
concentration.  The MEP standard was created by Congress to allow 
permits to be tailored to the specific nature of MS4 discharges.  Included 
in this grant of flexibility was the idea that the permit requirements could 
be directed at sources of pollution on a system-wide basis. 
Issuing permits on a system-wide basis allows municipal entities and 
other political subdivisions responsible for different parts of a single 
MS4 system to be co-permittees on a single permit.25  This approach is 
advantageous because it facilitates coordination and consolidation of 
MS4 activities and spreads the burden for monitoring, analysis, and 
development and implementation amongst those parties to the permit. 
The next important structural consideration to understand is the role of 
the states in administering the CWA’s provisions.  The EPA is 
authorized by the CWA to delegate NPDES permit issuing 
responsibilities to a state provided that the state has a permit program 
that is substantially equivalent to the federal program.26  California has 
enacted equivalency legislation authorizing it to implement and 
administer the CWA.27  The authority to issue MS4 permits is exercised 
 
 22. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B). 
 23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation of an Interim 
Permitting Approach for Water Quality-Based Effluent Limitations in Storm Water 
Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,425, 57,425–426 (Nov. 6, 1996). 
 25. See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i). 
 26. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
 27. CAL. WATER CODE § 13370(c) (West 1992). 
[I]t is in the interest of the people of the state, in order to avoid direct 
regulation by the federal government of persons already subject to regulation 
under state law pursuant to this division, to enact this chapter in order to 
authorize the state to implement the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, and federal 
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by the nine California Regional Water Quality Control Boards within the 
state.28  The State Regional Water Quality Control Board has administrative 
review authority over the regionally issued storm water permits.29 
In the early 1990s, regional boards began issuing MS4 permits based 
on the provisions in the CWA.  Some MS4 permits, for example those 
issued by the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board to San 
Diego and Orange County, “exceed” the requirements of federal law.30  
As discussed in the Part below dealing with the California 
Environmental Quality Act,31 this feature of going beyond the federal 
requirements is legally significant. 
The topic of storm water regulation has recently attracted the attention 
of the California Legislature.  In 1998, it added the Storm Water 
Enforcement Act32 to the Water Code.  In 2001, it added section 13383.5 
to the Water Code requiring the State Water Resources Control Board to 
develop, by January 1, 2003, minimum storm water monitoring and 
 
regulations and guidelines issued pursuant thereto, provided, that the state 
board shall request federal funding under the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities under this program. 
Id.; see also Storm Water Enforcement Act of 1998, CAL. WATER CODE § 13399.43 
(West Supp. 2003) (“For purposes of this chapter, ‘NPDES permit’ means a permit 
issued under the national pollutant discharge elimination system program in accordance 
with the Clean Water Act.”) (citation omitted). 
 28. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13200–13228 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003); see also id. § 
13160 (West 1992) (dealing with the state board’s authority to exercise any powers 
delegated to California by the CWA). 
 29. CAL. WATER CODE § 13320 (West 1992). 
 30. See San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, Comparison Between 
the Requirements of Tentative Order 2001-01, the Federal NPDES Storm Water 
Regulations, the Existing San Diego Municipal Storm Water Permit (Order 90-42), and 
Previous Drafts of the San Diego Municipal Storm Water Permit, agenda item 5, attach. 
4, at 2–3 (Dec. 13, 2000) (on file with author).  The comparison states:  
Approximately 60% of the requirements in Tentative Order 2001-01 are based 
solely on the 1990 federal NPDES Storm Water Regulations.  The remaining 
40% of the requirements in the Tentative Order “exceed the federal 
regulations.”  Requirements that “exceed the federal regulations” are either 
more numerous, more specific/detailed, or more stringent than the 
requirements in the regulations. 
Id. at 2.  The comparison goes on to discuss the provisions that exceed the federal 
regulations.  “The 40% of the requirements in Tentative Order 2001-01 which ‘exceed 
the federal regulations’ are based almost exclusively on (1) guidance documents 
developed by the USEPA; and (2) the SWRCB’s orders describing statewide precedent 
setting decisions on MS4 permits.”  Id. at 2–3. 
 31. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 32. 1998 Cal. Stat. 998 (1998) (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13399.25–.43 
(West Supp. 2003)). 
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sampling requirements for specified municipalities and industries.33  
As the politics of storm water regulation heat up, which they 
undoubtedly will, one can confidently predict more involvement by the 
legislature. 
The federal-state structural relationship is fundamental to understanding 
storm water regulation in California.  Decisionmakers and attorneys 
practicing in this area must understand both the CWA and the Porter-
Cologne Water Quality Control Act,34 which is the water quality control 
law through which California implements the CWA. 
III.  THE STORM WATER POLLUTION PROBLEM 
The significance of the storm water problem can be easily stated: it 
has been found to be the leading cause of water quality impairment in 
California,35 as well as nationally.  In November 2001, the State 
Water Resources Control Board and Regional Water Quality Control 
Boards adopted a strategic plan for the next five years.  One of the 
identified challenges contained in the plan is reducing storm water 
pollution.  The strategic plan captures the essence of the storm water 
problem: 
 The recent repeated closures of beaches in Southern California due to 
excessive bacteria levels in coastal waters has highlighted the significance of 
contaminated storm water in California.  During a storm, or other events 
where water flows across large expanses of pavement, that water may pick up 
pollutants along the way.  Water that flows down driveways and streets and 
into a gutter eventually makes its way into a storm drain, and then flows 
directly to a lake, river or the ocean.  Common pollutants that are picked up 
along the way include motor oil, pesticides, brake dust, pet wastes, paint, and 
household chemicals. 
 These pollutants can have harmful effects on drinking water supplies, 
recreational use, and wildlife.  The federal Clean Water Act requires that 
various industrial facilities, construction sites, and urban areas with more than 
100,000 people, control the amount of pollutants entering their storm drain 
systems.  This requirement will soon be expanded to include smaller 
communities as well.  Storm water pollution is an issue that touches almost 
 
 33. 2001 Cal. Stat. 492 (codified at  CAL. WATER CODE § 13383.5(b) (West Supp. 
2003)) (“This section only applies to regulated municipalities that were subject to a 
storm water permit on or before December 31, 2001, and to regulated industries that are 
subject to the General Permit for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial 
Activities Excluding Construction Activities.”). 
 34. CAL. WATER  CODE §§ 13200–13270 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003)).  For a useful 
introduction to the Porter-Cologne Act, see William R. Attwater & James Markle, 
Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957, 994–
1012 (1988).  The reader is cautioned, however, that changes to federal and state law 
have occurred since this article was published in 1988. 
 35. Storm Water Enforcement Act § 1, 1998 Cal. Stat. 998 (“The Legislature 
hereby finds and declares all of the following: (a) Unregulated storm water runoff is a 
leading cause of contamination of the state’s surface water and groundwater.”). 
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every Californian who is both part of the problem and part of the solution.  
Our challenge is two-fold: to educate the general public; and to work together 
with all parties to ensure compliance with pollutant discharge laws.36 
The waste products in urban storm water runoff frequently contain a 
toxic brew of metals, pesticides, fertilizers, animal waste, trash, and 
numerous other toxic substances.  This toxic brew often journeys 
through a community’s storm sewer system,37 picking up additional 
pollutants along the way, before being released into the community’s 
receiving waters.38  These receiving waters may be coastal waters, bays, 
lagoons, groundwater, or surface waters, including creeks, rivers or 
streams.  What is not mentioned by the strategic plan is that this 
dangerous concoction usually is discharged to the receiving waters 
without the benefit of any type of treatment to protect the public. 
The adverse impact with this release of the waste in urban runoff has 
broad environmental and economic consequences.  Urban storm water 
runoff may harm a community’s general hydrology system by increasing 
stream bank erosion, degrading benthic habitat, poisoning sediment, 
decreasing aquatic diversity, and limiting water contact recreational 
opportunities, including but not limited to beach closures.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the waste in contaminated urban storm water has broad 
adverse effects on a community’s environment, human health and safety,39 
and economy.40   
 
 36. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD & REGIONAL WATER QUALITY 
CONTROL BOARDS, STRATEGIC PLAN 8 (2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stra 
tegicplan/01strategic_plan.pdf.  The state and regional boards completed a strategic plan 
in 1995 and revised it in 1997.  Id. at 4.  The current strategic plan was promulgated on 
November 15, 2001.  Its purpose is to highlight priorities that need to be addressed 
during the next five years.  Id. 
 37. As used in this Article, the term “storm sewer system” is broadly inclusive.  It 
includes roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, curbs, gutters, ditches, natural 
drainage features or channels, and man-made channels or storm drains.  When natural 
drainage features or channels, such as an urban stream, are used as part of the storm 
sewer system, they are both part of the municipal conveyance system and the receiving 
water. 
 38. As used in this Article, the term “receiving waters” also is broadly inclusive.  It 
includes, for example, creeks, streams, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, estuaries, bays, and the ocean. 
 39. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 2–3, finding 6.  Urban runoff contains 
pollutants, which threaten human health.  Id.  Human illnesses have been linked to 
recreation activities in the proximity of storm drains, and pollutants from urban runoff 
can affect humans by entering the food chain.  Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Verne G. Kopytoff, Storm Drains Pose San Diego Health Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, § 5, at 3 (issuing a travel advisory due to dangerous storm water 
discharges); Kemp Powers, Beaches that Make You Go Ewwwww!  Don’t Go Near the 
Water, FORBES, July 3, 2000, at 295 (discussing vacation beach closures due to storm 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
 
254 
The public is clearly concerned with water pollution.  According to a 
recent research study by the California Water Awareness Campaign, the 
quality and quantity of water available rank as the two most important 
environmental issues facing California.41  Of the ten statewide issues, 
water quality and water supply ranked at the top with eighty-three 
percent and eighty-two percent of the respondents rating them, 
respectively, as “very important.”  Although water quality and water 
supply were separated for purposes of the survey, water quality and 
water supply are often interdependent as a practical matter.42  The amount 
of usable water for beneficial purposes is directly related to its quality. 
IV.  STRUCTURE AND THEORY: THE SAN DIEGO MS4 PERMIT 
One administrative effect of municipal storm water permitting is to 
subject many industrial and construction activities to dual, overlapping 
regulation both at the state and local level.  Industrial and construction 
activities are regulated independently by statewide general permits,43 as 
well as under local land use permitting.  This system of dual oversight of  
industrial and construction storm water discharges means that regulatory 
enforcement actions to secure compliance may be brought either by the 
 
water runoff contamination).  There is no accurate way to assess the economic effect of 
such negative press, but one can reasonably assume that it will have an adverse 
economic impact on the tourist economy. 
Another economic impact is on real estate values.  One EPA study revealed that 
property values in the area of Lake Champlain in the Northeastern United States with 
good water quality were valued an average of twenty percent more than property around 
poor water quality.  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LIQUID 
ASSETS: A SUMMERTIME PERSPECTIVE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEAN WATER TO THE 
NATION’S ECONOMY 8 (1996). 
 41. THE CALIFORNIA WATER AWARENESS CAMPAIGN, PUBLIC INFORMATION AND 
EDUCATION ASSESSMENT STUDY 2 (2001), available at http://www.wateraware.org/ 
surveyresults.html. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 
166  (1986) (describing California’s water problem as “not a lack of water but uneven 
distribution of water resources”). 
 43. In California, statewide general industrial and construction permits are adopted 
by the State Water Resources Control Board.  They generally prohibit the discharge of 
pollutants and nonstorm water, and require the use of BMPs to reduce site runoff.  
Industrial facilities subject to the CWA must either comply with the general permit or 
obtain individualized NPDES permits.  See State Water Res. Control Bd., Water Quality 
Order No. 97-03-DWQ, Nat’l Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys. General Permit No. 
CAS000001, at V (1997), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/ industrial.html.  
Dischargers subject to the general permit must develop and implement an effective 
Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) “to reduce or prevent pollutants 
associated with industrial activity in storm water discharges and authorized non-storm 
water discharges.”  Id. at IX; see also State Water Res. Control Bd., Order No. 99-108-
DWQ, Nat’l Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys. General Permit No. CA000002 
(1998), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/construction.html (statewide 
general construction storm water permitting for construction activities). 
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local authority or by the state.44 
Municipal storm water permits vary in their technical detail.  
Nevertheless, the San Diego MS4 permit is a useful vehicle to reify 
some of the legal issues surrounding the topic of storm water permitting 
generally.  The San Diego permit is complex.45  It is fifty-two pages in 
length, with another thirty or so pages of appendices.  Notwithstanding 
this complexity, the permit contains certain basic operating provisions, 
which may be likened to the gears of a car transmission. 
The operative provisions of the permit are as follows: (1) the findings 
on which the permit is based,46 (2) the general prohibition provisions47 
that apply unless the discharge qualifies for an exemption,48 (3) the 
Model Standard Urban Storm Water Mitigation Plan (SUSMP),49 (4) the 
 
 44. See, e.g., Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c) (2001) (federal 
regulation of storm water discharges associated with industrial and construction activity). 
 45. See generally Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6. 
 46. The standard of judicial review applicable to administrative decisions is 
important to the legal analysis of a storm water permit.  Review by the trial court is 
governed by the California Water Code.  It provides that “the court shall exercise its 
independent judgment on the evidence.”  CAL. WATER CODE § 13330 (West 1996 & 
Supp. 2003).  In exercising its judgment, the trial court must afford a strong presumption 
of correctness concerning administrative findings, and the party challenging the permit 
bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to 
the weight of the evidence.  See Fukuda v. City of Angels, 997 P.2d 693, 700 (Cal. 
1999).  The  compatibility of the presumption of correctness with the independent 
judgment standard was explained by the California Supreme Court in Fukuda. 
[T]he presumption provides the trial court with a starting point for review but 
it is only a presumption and may be overcome.  Because the trial court 
ultimately must exercise its own independent judgment, the court is free to 
substitute its own findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s 
findings. 
Id. at 701.  While the trial court is required to review the evidence supporting a storm 
water permit under the independent judgment standard of review, the substantial 
evidence test would apply to any appeal. 
 47. Discharges from the MS4 that have not been reduced to the MEP are 
prohibited.  Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 9.  Discharges are also subject to all 
Water Quality Control Plan (Basin Plan) restrictions, which means that discharges from 
the MS4 cannot cause or contribute to the exceedance of water quality standards.  Id. 
 48. Certain nonstorm water discharges in identified categories may be exempted 
from the general prohibition provided they are determined not to be a significant source 
of pollution by the co-permittee.  The identified categories which may be exempted are 
based on the federal regulations.  40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(iv)(B)(1) (2001). 
 49. The SUSMP addresses how the co-permittees will manage urban runoff from 
“new development” and “significant redevelopment,” which are terms of art defined in 
the permit.  Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 16.  It identifies minimum mandatory 
best management practice (BMP), criteria for sizing BMPs, and criteria for infiltration 
BMPs.  Id. at 3, finding 11. 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
 
256 
Jurisdictional Urban Runoff Management Program (JURMP),50 (5) the 
Watershed Urban Runoff Management Program (WURMP),51 and (6) 
various monitoring and reporting requirements. 
As previously noted, MS4 permitting is based primarily on the CWA.  
It also is based on state law.52  Simply put, the San Diego MS4 permit 
requires co-permittees, who authorize and realize the benefits from 
urban development,53 to exercise their land use authority as it pertains to 
planning, construction, and use and operation with an eye toward water 
quality impacts.  The permit is premised on the theory that the co-
permittees’ authority to regulate development carries with it the 
corresponding responsibility to address water quality impacts within its 
jurisdiction.  It is also predicated on the notion that pollution prevention 
and control by the authorizing land use entity provides the greatest and 
most cost-effective opportunity to protect water quality. 
V.  EMERGING LEGAL CONCERNS 
A.  California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 
Under CEQA,54 a public agency must prepare an environmental 
impact report (EIR) for projects that may have a “significant 
environmental effect.”55  As previously stated, the San Diego MS4 
permit, as well as that issued to Orange County, exceeds the federal 
regulations and is based in part on California law.56  As a result, the 
Building Industry Association (BIA) has challenged the San Diego 
 
 50. The JURMP documents describe how the co-permittees will manage urban 
runoff within their respective jurisdictions. Co-permittees also have the discretion to 
develop a model JURMP.  Id. at 13–14. 
 51. The WURMP operates in tandem with the JURMP.  It is based on the principle 
that urban runoff does not respect political boundaries, and that watershed-based land 
use planning enables multiple jurisdictions to work together to plan for the protection of 
shared natural water resources.  Id. at 7, finding 30. 
 52. Id. at 8, finding 37 (listing California state legal authority for order). 
 53. Id. at 4, finding 17. 
Urban development has three major phases: (1) land use planning for new 
development; (2) construction; and (3) the “use” or existing development 
phase.  Because the Co-permittees authorize, permit, and profit from each of 
these phases, and because each phase has a profound impact on water quality, 
the Co-permittees have commensurate responsibilities to protect water quality 
during each phase. 
Id.  One may take issue with the finding that co-permittees “profit” from these 
development phases on the theory that they are nonprofit entities. 
 54. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 1996). 
 55. “‘Significant effect on the environment’ means a substantial, or potentially 
substantial, adverse change in the environment.”  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068. 
 56. See supra note 30. 
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permit on the theory that it was issued in violation of CEQA.57  The 
regional board maintains that federal law authorizes California to adopt 
the provisions contained in the MS4 permit, and thus CEQA is not 
applicable.58  The BIA challenge raises an issue of general importance: 
the application of CEQA to storm water permits that contain provisions 
either more numerous, more specific or detailed, or more stringent than 
those contained in federal law or regulations. 
The BIA argues that CEQA applies, that the San Diego permit was 
issued in violation of CEQA, and that both the regional board and state 
board erroneously applied section 13389 of the Water Code, which 
contains the CEQA exemption.  It maintains that section 13389 only 
exempts permit provisions required to meet the nondiscretionary 
requirements of the CWA.  In brief, the BIA claims that the California 
Legislature did not give the regional board a CEQA “pass” for anything 
other than the CWA mandates and that the San Diego MS4 permit goes 
far beyond the federal requirements, thus subjecting it to CEQA review.59 
The analysis of this position usefully begins by identifying two 
considerations that are not in issue.  First is the purpose of CEQA.  It is 
intended to provide the fullest possible protection to the environment 
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.60  It is geared 
toward accomplishing this goal by informing government decisionmakers 
and the public about the potential adverse environmental effects of 
proposed projects and by preventing avoidable environmental damage 
from those projects.61  Thus, CEQA is intended to both inform and prevent 
avoidable harm. 
 
 57. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate Re: (1) California Environmental 
Quality Act; (2) Clean Water Act; (3) California Water Code; (4) California 
Constitution; (5) California Code of Civil Procedure; (6) California Administrative 
Procedures Act; (7) Statutory Record Review and California Constitution; Verified 
Complaint for (8) Declaration Relief; and (9) Injunctive Relief, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of 
San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Super. Ct. 2001) (No. 780263) 
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Mandate].  The BIA petitioned the court for a writ of 
mandate asking that the storm water permit be vacated and reissued in compliance with 
law, after consultation with the petitioners.  Id. at 1. 
 58.  Brief for State of California at 3–4, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County 
v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Super. Ct.) (No. 780263). 
 59. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 10–12.   
 60. “It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state government . . . 
shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing 
environmental damage . . . .”  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 1996). 
 61. DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 
111–12 (20th ed. 2000). 
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The second point not in issue is that projects proposed by developers 
and others subject to the MS4 permit are subject to CEQA review at the 
time they apply to the local land use authority for development, thus 
insuring environmental review.  CEQA applies to such proposals as part 
of the normal development process.  In other words, the CEQA exemption 
applies only to the issuance of the MS4 permit by the regional board; the 
exemption is not relevant to projects proposed by developers pursuant to 
the MS4 permit. 
The issuance of the MS4 permit by the regional board in and of itself 
has no immediate impact on the environment.  It simply establishes 
requirements that must be met to be in compliance with federal and state 
law.  Perhaps this is the reason why the BIA alleges that the plaintiffs 
“will be adversely affected by the changes to the environment caused by 
the Permit in that Petitioners and their members engage in homebuilding, 
construction, development, the provision of municipal services including 
firefighting, and the exercise of municipal land use authority,”62 not that 
the environment will be adversely affected. 
Assuming arguendo that CEQA applies to the MS4 permit issued by 
the regional board, the correct application of the CEQA exemption 
found in section 13389 of the California Water Code is critical.  This 
section provides: “Neither the state board nor the regional boards shall 
be required to comply with the provisions of [CEQA] prior to the 
adoption of any waste discharge requirement . . . .”63  As used in 
California, the term “waste discharge requirement” is the statutory 
equivalent of the term “NPDES permit” employed in the CWA.64 
To the extent that the MS4 permit is based on the CWA, the statutory 
language of section 13389 exempts the issuance of the permit from 
CEQA.  This conclusion is clear.  The California Supreme Court has 
observed: “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for 
construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the 
Legislature . . . .  Words used . . . ‘should be given the meaning they bear 
in ordinary use.’”65 
The state board relied on this principle in its recent MS4 
administrative decision holding that section 13389 generally exempts the 
issuance of MS4 permits from the CEQA process. 
 As we have stated in several prior orders, the provisions of CEQA requiring 
adoption of environmental documents do not apply to NPDES permits.  BIA 
contends that the exemption from CEQA contained in section 13389 applies 
 
 62. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 11. 
 63. CAL. WATER CODE § 13389 (West 1992). 
 64. Id. § 13374. 
 65. Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 940–41 (Cal. 1990) (citation 
omitted). 
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only to the extent that the specific provisions of the permit are required by the 
federal Clean Water Act.  This contention is easily rejected without addressing 
whether federal law mandated all of the permit provisions.  The plain language 
of section 13389 broadly exempts the Regional Water Board from the 
requirements of CEQA to prepare environmental documents when adopting 
“any waste discharge requirement” pursuant to Chapter 5.5 (13370 et seq., 
which applies to NPDES permits).  BIA cites the decision in Committee for a 
Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Board.  That case upheld 
the State Water Board’s view that section 13389 applies only to NPDES 
permits, and not to waste discharge requirements that are adopted pursuant only 
to state law.  The case did not concern an NPDES permit, and does not support 
BIA’s argument.66 
The Gilroy decision is factually distinguishable and does not squarely 
support the state board’s decision.  In Gilroy, a final EIR was prepared 
for the expansion of a wastewater treatment plant, which admittedly was 
a “project” under CEQA.67  The court found that the challenged orders 
were issued under the exclusive authority of the Porter-Cologne Act.  
The orders were not required by the CWA.68  Therefore, Gilroy does not 
specifically answer the question of whether the statutory exemption 
applies to situations when the permit generally is based on federal law, 
but certain provisions of the permit exceed the requirements of federal law. 
The CWA generally recognizes independent state authority to enact 
and implement its own standards and requirements provided that they 
are at least as stringent as those required by the CWA.69  With respect to 
the specific regulation of storm water, the CWA provides that permits 
“[s]hall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the 
maximum extent practicable, including management practices, control 
techniques and system design and engineering methods, and such other 
provisions as the Administrator or the State determines appropriate for 
the control of such pollutants.”70  The italicized language authorizes 
states to adopt storm water controls that are determined appropriate even 
though they may exceed federal requirements. 
Although undoubtedly authorized by federal law to act, state law 
controls the application of the CEQA exemption.  Chapter 5.5 of the 
 
 66. In re Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 
SWRCB Order 2001-15, 13 (Nov. 15, 2001) (citation omitted), available at 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf. 
 67. Comm. for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. 
Rptr. 732–33 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 68. Id. at 732. 
 69. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000). 
 70. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (emphasis 
added). 
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Water Code,71 which contains the exemption, was added by the 
California Legislature in order to allow the state to implement or 
administer the provisions of the CWA.72  Read in isolation, section 
13389 provides a strong argument for exempting the MS4 permit from 
CEQA.  Moreover, the argument is buttressed by the fact that it is the 
only section to specifically reference CEQA. 
However, statutes should be read in context.  Section 13372 provides 
the arguable context for narrowly reading the exemption.  It states that 
chapter 5.5 “shall be construed to assure consistency with the 
requirements for state programs implementing” the CWA and that “[t]he 
provisions of this chapter shall apply only to actions required under 
[CWA] and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto.”73  This 
limitation raises the derivative question as to whether the MS4 permit is 
an “action” required by the CWA.  Unfortunately, the section does not 
define the term “action.” 
On the one hand, one may argue that the term “action” is defined by 
the initiating federal requirement to issue MS4 permits and the 
accompanying authorization to go beyond federal law.  According to this 
view the permit is indivisible, and the term “action” includes all of the 
constituent parts of the permit regardless of whether they exceed federal 
law.  This interpretation would mean that the CEQA exemption applies. 
On the other hand, if the term “action” refers to the specific provisions 
of the permit, then the exemption might not apply to those permit 
provisions based exclusively on state law.  But this construction is 
problematic.  Section 13377 of the Water Code authorizes regional 
boards to issue waste discharge requirements that “apply and ensure 
compliance with all applicable provisions of the act [CWA]” as well as 
“any more stringent effluent standards or limitations necessary to 
implement water quality control plans, or for the protection of beneficial 
uses, or to prevent nuisance.”74  This section is instructive to the proper 
interpretation of the term “action.”  It supports the view that the term 
“action” should be broadly construed to cover all of the provisions of the 
permit because the legislature used specific language, “standards or 
limitations,” when it wanted to identify specific provisions within the 
permit that go beyond the requirements of the CWA. 
Given the broad grant of authority under federal law and the expressed 
intent by the California Legislature to exercise its authority, the preferred 
interpretation is to apply the exemption without delineating the overlap with 
 
 71. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370–13389 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003). 
 72. Id. § 13370. 
 73. Id. § 13372 (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. § 13377. 
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federal law.  There are several policy considerations that justify treating the 
permit as a whole for purposes of applying the CEQA exemption. 
Unless one was to successfully argue that the permit in its entirety is 
subject to CEQA, which is a dubious proposition, the permit would have 
to be dissected in order to determine which parts were subject to CEQA.  
The first policy concern is whether this approach is practical.  The 
selective application of CEQA to parts of the permit would necessitate 
successfully disentangling the federal and state provisions in order to 
apply CEQA to the state-based part of the permit.  This task would be 
both factually and legally difficult, especially in light of the broad grants 
of authority.75 
Another policy consideration is whether the purposes of CEQA would 
be advanced by selective application to the state-based portion of the 
permit.  Actually, the opposite might occur.  The goal of protecting the 
environment could be undermined by a narrow or selective application 
of the exemption.  The administration of CEQA would become 
significantly more complicated and administratively difficult in the area 
of storm water permitting.  For example, if the state-based monitoring 
requirement were found to go beyond that required under the CWA, the 
monitoring requirement would be arguably subject to CEQA, but 
presumably not the other provisions of the permit. 
Finally, the CEQA process applies to “projects,”76 which are required 
by law to be defined with sufficient specificity to make the CEQA 
process capable of sensible application.  Given that the MS4 area permit 
covers a large geographic region, properly defining the project so that 
CEQA could be sensibly applied would be next to impossible.  The 
reason is straightforward.  There is no actual project until a specific 
proposal is submitted by someone subject to the permit.  This point is 
 
 75. The URMPs impose restrictions that apply to infiltration and groundwater.  
Federal courts are divided on the application of the CWA to groundwater.  Compare 
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that “[n]either the Clean Water Act nor the EPA’s definition asserts authority 
over ground waters, just because these may be hydrologically connected with surface 
waters”), with Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1319–20 (S.D. 
Iowa 1997) (holding that “[b]ecause the CWA’s goal is to protect the quality of surface 
waters, the NPDES permit system regulates any pollutants that enter such waters either 
directly or through groundwater”).  In Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Eng’r, the Supreme Court may have indicated that isolated ground 
water is not subject to CWA jurisdiction, but this interpretation is far from certain.  531 
U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001). 
 76. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1996) (defining the term “project”). 
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critical to the future success of storm water permitting.  Unless the 
federal and state-based requirement could be separated and sensibly 
applied to the facts, applying CEQA would undoubtedly mean the end to 
area-wide storm water permits, a result which would contravene the 
express language of CWA authorizing such permits. 
B.  Section 402(p) of the Clean Water Act  
The application of the MEP standard has generated controversy.  One 
concern involves the analytical link between the MEP77 standard and the 
“water quality standard” that defines the water quality goals for a water 
body.78  This concern is acute when a municipal storm water permit 
prohibits storm water discharges that cause or contribute to a violation 
of water quality standards and also imposes the MEP standard.  
Undoubtedly, some of the controversy surrounding the application of the 
MEP stems from the fact that neither the CWA nor federal regulations 
define the term “MEP.”  In this situation, the correct fit between the two 
standards is critical.  It is also a focal point for potential litigation. 
The phase II storm water regulations provide an explanation for the 
absence of a definition: “There is no regulatory definition of MEP in order 
to allow the permitting authority and regulated MS4s maximum flexibility 
in their interpretation of it” as they develop and implement their 
 
 77. The EPA has identified the following factors as relevant to the MEP standard: 
(1) storm water discharge size, (2) climate, (3) implementation schedules, (4) current 
ability to finance the program, (5) hydrology, (6) capacity to perform operation and 
maintenance, (8) conditions of receiving waters, and (9) other specific local concerns and 
aspects included in a comprehensive watershed plan.  National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program 
Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,754 (Dec. 8, 1999) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124) (phase II storm water rules). 
 78. Federal water quality standards consist of two components: (1) the goals or 
designated beneficial uses for waters, and (2) the water quality criteria to support those 
goals or beneficial uses.  Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(i) (2001).  The 
water quality criteria identify the constituent concentrations or levels to support a 
designated beneficial use.  40 C.F.R. § 131(b).  The concentrations or levels are 
expressed either in numeric or narrative terms, and are simply the means to reach the 
stated goal.  Id.  For example, a designated beneficial use might be “contact water 
recreation,” such as swimming, wading, and water skiing.  The associated water quality 
criteria for contact water recreation expressed in numeric terms might be that the average 
level of fecal coliform bacteria concentration for any thirty day period shall not exceed 
2000 cells/100 milliliters of water.  A narrative or descriptive formulation might provide 
that the waters “be free of floating debris, scum and other materials.”  For an example of 
a Water Quality Control Plan, see generally Water Quality Control Plan for the San Diego 
Basin (9), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/programs/basinplan.html. 
The California Water Code uses the term “water quality objectives” as an equivalent to 
the federal term “water quality criteria.”  CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(h) (West 1992).  
Section 13050(f) of the California Water Code generally describes the beneficial uses 
that may be protected. 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
[VOL. 40:  245, 2003]  Municipal Storm Water Permitting 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 263 
programs.79  The San Diego MS4 permit adds some additional detail: 
[T]he definition of MEP is dynamic and will be defined by the following 
process over time: municipalities propose their definition of MEP by way of 
their Urban Runoff Management Plan.  Their total collective and individual 
activities conducted pursuant to the Urban Runoff Management Plan becomes 
their proposal for MEP as it applies both to their overall effort, as well as to 
specific activities (e.g., MEP for street sweeping, or MEP for municipal 
separate storm sewer maintenance).80 
In the absence of a proposal acceptable by the co-permittee, the San 
Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (SDRWQCB) retains the 
control to define MEP. 
The San Diego MS4 permit requires co-permittees to meet both the 
MEP standard and water quality standards.81  An iterative, consensus-
based process is to be used when a storm water discharge exceeds water 
quality standards.  If a receiving water quality standard is exceeded, the 
co-permittee is required to submit a written report identifying the 
additional best management practices (BMPs) or other measures that 
will be taken to achieve water quality standards.  The co-permittee is 
then required to revise its JURMP and implement the revised plan.82  
This approach carries the benefit of building into the process 
experimentation based on actual practices. 
Once this protocol has been completed, the co-permittee “does not 
have to repeat the same procedure for continuing or recurring 
exceedances to the same receiving water limitations unless directed by 
the SDRWQCB to do so.”83  This process of attempting to achieve 
compliance with the water quality standard is an application of the MEP 
standard.  Properly understood, the iterative protocol is consistent with 
the MEP standard. 
There may be instances, however, when the iterative process does not 
sufficiently protect the public interest.  This would occur in cases when 
continuing or recurring exceedances of water quality standards occur.84  
 
 79. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STORM WATER PHASE 
II COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE GUIDE § 4.6.1 (2000). 
 80. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at D-3. 
 81. Id. at 9. 
 82. Id. at 10–11. 
 83. Id. at 11. 
 84. Industrial dischargers must meet the effluent provisions found in section 1311 
of the United States Code.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A) (2000).  Section 1311 requires 
that dischargers, including industrial dischargers, “shall . . . achiev[e] . . . any more 
stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards . . . 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
 
264 
In this situation, the permit gives the SDRWQCB the right to mandate 
that increased steps be taken by the co-permittee to achieve water quality 
standards.85 
One may argue that the San Diego MS4 permit violates the MEP 
requirement of section 402(p).  The BIA, for example, argued that the 
co-permittees are required to implement more onerous BMPs, regardless 
of whether those additional BMPs exceed the MEP standard.86  This 
claim appears to be an attack, albeit indirect, on the use of water quality 
standards in the permit.  If so, the argument should be assessed based on 
the decision in Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner.87 
In Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs argued that the EPA was 
required or mandated by the CWA to use state water quality standards in 
the contested MS4 permit.88  The Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA’s 
discretion to use or not use water quality standards in the challenged 
storm water permit.89  In other words, the court held that the EPA has 
the discretionary authority to determine that ensuring strict compliance 
with state water quality standards is necessary to control pollutants. 
The state board followed this reasoning in the administrative challenge 
to the San Diego MS4 permit when it concluded that “[t]he Regional 
Water Board appropriately required compliance with water quality 
standards and included requirements to achieve reduction of pollutants 
to the maximum extent practicable.”90  According to the state board’s 
reading of Defenders of Wildlife, regional boards generally are 
empowered to issue MS4 permits that require compliance with water 
quality standards through iterative BMPs.91 
Alternatively, the BIA’s claim may be that the permit requires “zero 
contribution” of pollutants in runoff, and “in effect” contains numeric 
 
established pursuant to any State law or regulation . . . .”  33 U.S.C. § 1311.  This 
approach is consistent with the one taken by the NPDES permit for storm water 
discharges by Caltrans.  See State Water Res. Control Bd., Order No. 99-06-DWQ, ¶ C-
1-3 (July 15, 1999), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/1999/wqo99-
06.html.  Unfortunately, the situation with respect to MS4 permitting is not clearly 
stated. 
 85. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
 86. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 13. 
 87. 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 88. Id. at 1161. 
 89. Id. at 1166. 
 90. In re Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 
SWRCB Order WQ 2001-15, 16 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/ 
resdec/wqorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf. 
 91. To ensure that MS4 discharges comply with water quality standards, the state 
board has adopted the EPA’s language which dictates implementation of an iterative 
process when water quality standards are not met.  State Water Res. Control Bd., Order 
No. WQ-99-05, at 1 (June 17, 1999), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/ 
wqorders/1999/wqo99-05.html. 
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effluent limitations.  This view is also problematic.  This argument was 
addressed by the state board when it observed, “this simply is not 
true.”92  The state board concluded that “[t]he permit is clearly BMP-
based, and there are no numeric effluent limitations.”93  Although the 
state board recognized the option of using numeric effluent discharges 
where site-specific conditions call for them, the state board obviously 
thought that the emphasis in the San Diego MS4 permit was on the use 
of BMPs. 
C.  Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act and Local Authority 
The BIA contends that the MS4 permit violates the general provisions 
of the CWA.94  It argues that these CWA provisions preserve and protect 
“the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and 
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water 
resources . . . .”95  In the BIA’s view, the permit unlawfully interferes 
with the valid exercise by local government of its land use authority.96  
The BIA specifically identifies the JURMP (section F of the permit) as 
objectionable based on this theory.  Among other contentions, it 
identifies the “development project approval processes” as infringing on 
the co-permittees’ right to regulate land use and “unlawfully direct the 
co-permittees to regulate” as the regional board and state board see fit.97 
In assessing the force of this argument, one should first realize that 
federal law directs states to comply with the dictates of section 402(p) of 
the CWA.  Next, it is apparent that section 101(b) of the CWA  preserves 
the rights of the states, not local government. 
The California Constitution grants cities the power to “make and 
enforce within [their] limits all local, police, sanitary, and other 
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”98  
However, there are two limitations stated in this constitutional grant of 
power.  One is the jurisdictional or territorial limitation, and the other is 
 
 92. In re Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 
SWRCB Order WQ 2001-15, at 8 n.17 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb. 
ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 13. 
 95. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 13–14. 
 98. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
 
266 
the subordination of local authority to state law. 
Local land use authority is conferred by the California Constitution.  
In exercising this authority, local government is constrained by the 
general laws of the state.  The Porter-Cologne Act grants the state and 
regional boards the authority to issue and administer storm water 
permits.  To the extent that this is seen as interfering with the authority 
of local government, as is argued by the BIA, this authority arguably has 
been preempted by the action of the California Legislature.99 
Finally, there are questions of policy that should inform the analysis.  
Monitoring data for San Diego indicates that approximately fifty percent 
or more of the total pollutant load for many constituents are contributed 
by urban land uses, including residential, commercial, and industrial 
activities.100  It seems reasonable to conclude that the prior land use 
policies and practices intended to protect water quality from the impacts 
of urban development have not been entirely effective.  Thus, a 
statewide interest exists in controlling the adverse impacts of storm 
water pollution, and the state, acting through its regional boards, should 
be accorded the opportunity to try creative solutions to rectify an 
admittedly serious problem.  Broadly implemented new strategies and 
techniques, which transcend local interests, are necessary to effectively 
deal with the problem.  These new storm water approaches are based on 
EPA and state board guidance, and are supported by recent and ongoing 
technical support.  In the final analysis, the JURMP, as well as other 
parts of the San Diego MS4 permit, appears consistent with directions 
contained in section 101(b) of the CWA . 
D.  Watershed and Third Party Liability Considerations 
In the United States, the concept of water resources management 
within watersheds can be detected in early judicial decisions.  In 1795, 
for example, the court in Merritt v. Parker101 observed that “water flows 
in its natural channel, and ought always to be permitted to run there, so 
that all, through whose land it pursues its natural course, may continue to 
enjoy the privilege of using it for their own purposes.”  This view led to 
the “natural flow” rule that allowed riparian landowners to use the 
natural flow of a river, and prohibited any diversion that would 
materially affect the flow to others on the river.102  Other early views, 
such as riparian rights only attaching to land within the watershed, 
 
 99. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 100. WOODWARD CLYDE, 1997–1998 CITY OF SAN DIEGO AND CO-PERMITTEE 
NPDES STORMWATER MONITORING PROGRAM REPORT 6–19 (1998) (on file with author). 
 101. 1 N.J.L. 526, 530 (1795). 
 102. Id.  
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support the notion that water resource management was an important 
part of the law at the founding of our country.103 
The early focus on water resources management stressed the 
efficient use of water for such uses as energy generation, navigation, 
farming, and drinking water.  In contrast, watershed management, a 
concept incorporated into the San Diego MS4 permit, is broader in scope.  
It calls for decisionmaking on an integrated or holistic basis.  A 
“watershed,” “river basin,” or “drainage basin” approach focuses on the 
entire surface drainage area of the hydrological unit.  It calls for an 
analysis of the various land use activities within the watershed.104  In 
much the same way that air pollution transcends the jurisdictional lines 
between communities, land use activities often bear little or no 
relationship to government-drawn boundaries.  Thus, it is predictable 
that urban runoff will not respect or follow politically defined 
boundaries.  Except to the extent that it is channeled, it is not a startling 
proposition that urban runoff inevitably flows in its natural channels 
throughout a particular watershed. 
The San Diego MS4 permit requires co-permittees to establish a 
WURMP.105  Watershed planning involves four steps: (1) identification of 
the shared watersheds; (2) the identification, assessment, and prioritization 
of the natural, social, and other watershed resources; (3) prioritization of 
areas for growth, protection, and conservation; and (4) development of 
plans and regulations to guide growth and protect resources.106  Because 
the land use actions within the watershed have both an interrelated and 
cumulative impact, co-permittee collaboration is essential to minimizing 
receiving water quality degradation from land use activities. 
Broad legal authority exists in the CWA, accompanying regulations, 
and California Water Code107 to use a watershed approach in water 
 
 103. See, e.g., Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 511–14 (Va. 1921) 
(discussing generally cases and treatises on riparian rights). 
 104. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 42. 
 105. Id. at 44. 
 106. SAN DIEGO REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, FACT 
SHEET/TECHNICAL REPORT FOR SDRWQCB ORDER NO. R9-2002-0001 68 (2001) 
[hereinafter SDRWQCB FACT SHEET]. 
 107. Regional Water Qualify Control Boards are organized in California on 
watershed or drainage basin principles.  See CAL. WATER CODE § 13200 (West 1992).  
The San Diego region, for example, comprises all basins draining into the Pacific Ocean 
between the southern boundary of the Santa Ana region and the California-Mexico 
border.  Id. § 13200(f); see also id. § 13777 (dealing with the implementation of CWA 
provisions). 
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quality planning.  In the CWA’s declaration of goals and policies, 
Congress requires federal agencies to “co-operate with State and local 
agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and 
eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water 
resources.”108  Other provisions of the CWA more clearly identify the 
call for using watershed principles.  Section 319, dealing with state 
nonpoint source management programs, provides that “[a] State shall, to 
the maximum extent practicable, develop and implement a management 
program under this subsection on a watershed-by-watershed basis within 
such State.”109 
Courts have also recognized the relevance of watershed principles.  In 
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology,110 the 
Supreme Court endorsed a watershed approach in the context of 401 
certification.111  The Court held that states could condition certification 
of the project on any limitations necessary to ensure compliance with 
state water quality standards or other appropriate requirements of state 
law, and that the state’s authority to impose minimum flow requirements 
is not limited on theory that it interfered with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s authority to license hydroelectric projects.112  
In a broad sense, the decision allows states to protect aquatic ecosystems 
within the framework of the watershed unit. 
Section 402(p) authorizes the issuance of MS4 permits on a 
jurisdiction or system-wide basis.113  The federal regulations authorize 
permits to be issued on a watershed basis,114 and management programs 
may be similarly based.115  Finally, the State Water Resources Control 
Board Urban Runoff Technical Advisory Committee recommends that 
“municipal permits should have watershed specific components.”116 
A watershed approach inevitably raises interjurisdictional complications.  
Thus, it is predictable that a common concern raised by co-permittees is 
potential liability for pollutant contributions to their MS4 system from 
other jurisdictions.  This issue was recently addressed by the 
Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) in the City of Irving, Texas MS4 
 
 108. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000). 
 109. Id. § 1329 (b)(4) (2000). 
 110. 511 U.S. 700, 717 (1994). 
 111. Section 401 of the CWA gives states the authority to certify, condition, or veto 
federal permits based on state water quality standards.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
 112. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 712, 722. 
 113. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i) (2000). 
 114. Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(3)(ii), (a)(3)(v), (a)(5) (2001). 
 115. Id. § 122.26(d)(2)(iv) (“Proposed programs may impose controls on a 
systemwide basis, a watershed basis, a jurisdiction basis or on individual outfalls.”). 
 116. SDRWQCB FACT SHEET, supra note 106, at attach. 2. 
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case.117  One of the challenges made by Irving was that the permit made 
the city liable for the failure of other co-permittees to fulfill their permit 
obligations.118  In essence, Irving argued that it could incur liabilities for 
parts of the broader system beyond its operational control. 
In analyzing the issue of potential liability for third party co-permittee 
conduct, the EAB reasoned: 
In anticipation of intra-system, multiple-permit approaches to storm water 
management, the [federal] rules provide: 
Co-permittees need only comply with permit conditions relating to 
discharges from municipal separate storm sewers for which they are the 
operators.   
40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(iv) (emphasis added).  We conclude that the better 
interpretation here is one that reconciles the text of the permit with the rule upon 
which it is based, and thus interpret [the permit] to mean that irrespective of any 
agreements into which Irving might enter related to storm water management, 
Irving remains ultimately responsible for those portions—and only those 
portions—of the MS4 within its operational control.119 
The appeals board went on to recognize that Irving might enter into 
legally binding agreements that enlarge the scope of its liability.  In such 
a case, liability would be based on such an agreement, not on the 
permit’s requirement of operational control.120 
The question of third party liability in the San Diego MS4 permit is 
apt to stem from finding fifteen.  This finding is entitled “Co-permittees’ 
Responsibility for Illicit Discharges from Third Parties.”  It states the 
following principle:  
 As operators of MS4s, the Co-permittees cannot passively receive and 
discharge pollutants from third parties.  By providing free and open access to 
an MS4 that conveys discharges to the waters of the United States, the 
operator of an MS4 that does not prohibit and/or control discharges into its 
system essentially accepts responsibility for those discharges.121   
The finding does not distinguish between dischargers within the MS4 
 
 117. City of Irving, Texas, Mun. Separate Storm Sewer Sys., Environmental Appeal 
Board, No. 00-18 (July 16, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/disk11/irving.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2003). The NPDES MS4 permit was issued to Irving, the Dallas 
County Utility and Reclamation District, the Dallas County Flood Control District 
(district I), and the Irving Flood Control Districts (sections I and III).  Id. at 2. 
 118. Id. at 7. 
 119. Id. at 25–26. 
 120. Id. at 26 n.19. 
 121. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 4. 
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territory and those outside the territory. 
Presumably the link between this finding and the operative provisions 
of the permit is the section on the elimination of illicit discharges and 
connections. It requires each co-permittee to immediately eliminate all 
illicit discharges, discharge sources, and connections.122  This requirement 
is arguably stricter than the emphasis in the finding on “prohibit and/or 
control.”  To the extent that an interjurisdictional discharge is treated as an 
improper “discharge source,” the permit requires immediate elimination, 
not just control.  Arguably, the receiving co-permittee is in violation of the 
permit if it fails to eliminate the discharge. 
As a matter of interpretation, a co-permittee should be held accountable 
only to the extent that it has the power to effectively control the 
noncomplying interjurisdictional discharge.  This construction is informed 
and based on the finding that the co-permittee should not simply passively 
standby, which suggests a fault-based standard.  Thus, to the extent that 
the co-permittee has no control and receives no benefit from the 
interjurisdictional discharge, imposing liability under such circumstances 
would violate fundamental principles of fairness and contravene a fault-
based rationale.  The paradigm case of potential unfairness would be 
where the MS4 system consists of an interjurisdictional natural water 
course where the receiving co-permittee is forced to accept the 
discharge.123  One possible solution to this situation is an enforcement 
action by the regional board against the noncomplying discharger, not 
the receiving co-permittee.  Another is an interjurisdictional agreement 
on rights and duties. 
E.  Proposition 218: Articles XIIIC and XIIID of the                    
California Constitution 
The funding of local storm water management programs is important 
to the future success of storm water regulation in California.  In June 
2002, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth District decided 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas.124  In this taxpayer’s 
suit against the city of Salinas, the court of appeal held that the city’s 
storm water drainage fee was invalid because the fee was adopted 
without being submitted for voter approval as required by proposition 
 
 122. Id. at 36. 
 123. See id. at 6, finding 28 (“During its downstream course, urban runoff is 
conveyed through lined and unlined (natural, manmade, and partially modified) 
channels, all of which are defined as components of the Co-permittees’ MS4.”). 
 124. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 
5938 (2002).   
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218.125  The city did adopt the fee, however, in accordance with the 
noticing requirements of proposition 218.126 
Although the California courts previously have wrestled with the 
application of  proposition 218 in other factual contexts, Salinas is the 
first appellate decision applying it to storm water regulation.127  This fact 
is sufficient to make the case important to regulators and those affected 
by storm water regulation, but there are additional reasons why the case 
is significant. 
The Salinas decision has both statewide and local implications.  On a 
statewide basis, the state has assumed the responsibility for controlling 
storm water under the CWA.  Storm water management is implemented 
and funded at the local level.  Funding has been generally accomplished 
through discharger fees and charges without the benefit or support of 
federal or state funding.  Treating storm water fees as subject to voter 
approval threatens the viability of many existing municipal storm water 
management programs.  In doing so, California’s strategy for controlling 
storm water discharges through local government is also jeopardized. 
The decision also has important local consequences.  Municipalities 
have been increasingly dependent on the ability to impose fees on the 
end users of the MS4.  Local government will be inhibited from using 
storm water fee programs similar to the one used by Salinas without first 
complying with the voter approval process.  On the one hand, the court 
of appeal decision is likely to breed some degree of uncertainty at the 
local level.  On the other hand, noncompliance with MS4 permit 
requirements will subject local government to enforcement actions, with 
accompanying civil liability, brought by regional boards or other citizen 
suits.  The challenge for co-permittees is compounded by the permit 
application process requirement that funding sources be analyzed.128  In 
short, the Salinas decision places co-permittees in a bind. 
Given the importance of the Salinas decision, a closer look at it is 
warranted.129  The city of Salinas maintained separate sanitary and storm 
 
 125. Id. at 234. 
 126. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(a). 
 127. The California Supreme Court recently granted review of a case involving a 
proposition 218 challenge to a water connection charge for fire suppression.  Richmond 
v. Shasta Comty. Serv. Dist., 47 P.3d 222 (2002). 
 128. Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(vi) (2001) (“Such analysis 
shall include a description of the source of funds that are proposed to meet the necessary 
expenditures, including legal restrictions on the use of such funds.”). 
 129. The California attorney general has issued two possibly contradictory opinions 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
 
272 
water systems, which is common practice in California.  In order to fund 
and comply with the federal CWA storm water requirements, the city 
adopted a storm water management utility fee.  The fee was imposed on 
every developed parcel of land and the owners and occupiers.  The fee 
was then calculated in proportion to the degree to which the impervious 
area of the land contributed runoff to the city’s storm water drainage 
system.130  Undeveloped property in a natural state was not subject to the 
fee.  The court of appeal found that the storm water fee was subject to 
voter approval under proposition 218 and was invalid because the fee 
had not been submitted to the voters for their approval.131 
 
on the subject of article XIIID.  In 1998, the attorney general concluded that a Vallejo 
Sanitation District storm sewer user fee was not exempt under article XIIID.  81 Op. Cal. 
Att’y Gen. 104, 110 (1998).  Although the specific concern was the application of 
section 6(b)(3), id. at 105, the attorney general did find the storm water fee “property-
related,” id. at 107.  See also CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(b)(3) (“The amount of a fee or 
charge imposed upon any parcel or person as an incident of property ownership shall not 
exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.”).  In 2001, the 
attorney general addressed the following question: “May a city impose storm drainage 
pollution abatement charges with respect to property owned by school districts . . . 
within the city’s boundaries to fund the city’s activities in meeting federal stormwater 
discharge requirements?”  84 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 61 (2001).  Without considering article 
XIIID, the attorney general found that storm water fees are permissible under section 
5471 of the Health and Safety Code, which expressly authorizes cites to establish 
charges for their storm drainage services.  Id. at 62.  These user fees could be imposed by 
a city upon local school districts within its boundaries to fund the city’s service 
activities, not capital facilities, in meeting NPDES federal storm water requirements.  Id. 
at 65. 
 130. Historically, Salinas maintained its storm and surface water management 
system through general fund expenditures.  However, faced with the CWA NPDES 
mandate, on June 1, 1999, the City Council adopted ordinance 2350 to establish a storm 
water management and discharge control program, and ordinance 2351 to create an 
enterprise and utility of the city as the means to serve the funding and maintenance of 
this program.  Brief for the Appellant at 3–5, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of 
Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (No. H022665). 
Ordinance 2351 established a storm water management utility fee imposed upon users 
of the storm water drainage system, with the basis and amount of the fee to be 
established by resolution.  On July 20, 1999, the Council adopted Resolution No. 17019 
establishing rates and regulations for the Storm and Surface Water Management System 
Enterprise and Utility.  This resolution established storm drainage fees in the amount of 
$18.66 per year on each single-family residential parcel.  For multiple-family and 
commercial parcels, the annual storm drainage fee was calculated at the rate of $5.5196 
per 1,000 square feet of “impervious area” on the property.  The implementing 
regulations exempt “undeveloped” property, and also allow an exemption or a 
proportional reduction to developed parcels that have their own maintained storm water 
management facilities that do not fully utilize city facilities to make no substantial or 
only a partial contribution of storm or surface water to the city’s storm drainage 
facilities.  The purpose of these fees was to provide a method for payment of all or any 
part of the cost and expense of improving, maintaining, and operating storm and surface 
water control facilities, including all or any part of the cost and expense for planning, 
designing, establishing, developing, and constructing such facilities, or to pay or secure 
the payment of all or any portion of any indebtedness incurred for such purpose.  Id.   
 131. Salinas, 121 Cal Rptr. 2d at 231. 
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The California electorate approved proposition 218, which was entitled 
by its authors as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” on November 5, 
1996.132  It added articles XIIIC and XIIID to the California Constitution, 
and in doing so made numerous fundamental changes to local government 
finance law.  The general thrust of the law was to limit the methods by 
which local government could exact revenue from taxpayers without their 
consent.133 
The city of Salinas first argued that the storm water fee was not 
subject to article XIIID.  If the fee was subject to the general provisions 
of article XIIID, the city then argued that the fee was exempt under the 
special service fee provisions stated in the law.134  Neither argument 
made by the city was successful. 
1. Sections 6 and 2(e) of Article XIIID: “Incident of Property 
Ownership” Fees Require Voter Approval 
Several provisions of article XIIID were important to the claim before 
the court of appeal.  Article XIIID, section 6, deals with the need for 
voter approval for new or increased fees and charges.  It contains the 
following operative provision: 
Except for fees or charges for sewer, water, and refuse collection services, no 
property related fee or charge shall be imposed or increased unless and until that 
fee or charge is submitted and approved by a majority vote of the property 
owners of the property subject to the fee or charge or, at the option of the 
agency, by a two-thirds vote of the electorate siding in the affected area.135 
 
 132. For one of the most authoritative sources on proposition 218, see LEAGUE OF 
CALIFORNIA CITIES, PROPOSITION 218 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (2000), available at 
http://www.cacities.org/doc.asp?id=603.  The 1997 Implementation Guide was cited 
approvingly in McBrearty v. City of Brawley, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 n.5 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997).  See generally Robert E. Merritt & Rajiv Parikh, The Proposition 218 
Odyssey: New Challenges for Real Property Development, 20 REAL PROP. L. REP. 70 
(1997) (discussing major changes required by proposition 218, and proposing 
alternatives for financing public improvements); John S. Throckmorton, What is a 
Property-Related Fee?  An Interpretation of California’s Proposition 218, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1059 (1997) (drawing on legislation to discuss the meaning of a “property-related 
fee”); Mona Patel, Comment, Is Nothing Certain but Death? The Uncertainty Created by 
California’s Proposition 218, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (2001) (arguing for a definition of 
“property-related fee” that takes into account a direct relationship to property 
ownership).  
 133. Proposition 218 § 2, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 218 (West). 
 134. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232–34. 
 135. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(c).  The election shall be conducted not less than 
forty-five days after the public hearing.  Id. § 6(a)(2). 
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In applying this section, one must turn to the definition of “fee,” 
which is found in section 2(e).136  The term “fee” is defined as a levy 
imposed  “upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property 
ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related 
service.”137  Unfortunately, the triggering provision “as an incident of 
property ownership” is not defined.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that if 
the fee is not imposed “as an incident of property ownership,” then 
section 6 of article XIIID does not apply and voter approval is not 
necessary. 
Although the phrase “as an incident of property ownership” is not 
defined, section 2(e) contains the clause,  “including a user fee” for a 
“property-related service.”  The scope of the term “property-related 
service” is defined in section(2)(h) as “a public service having a direct 
relationship to property ownership.”138  Thus, if the user fee has a direct 
relationship to property ownership then voter approval is required.  If the 
fee is considered indirect, then one would have to determine whether the 
fee is imposed “as an incident of property ownership.”  This 
methodology would be necessary because of the direct relationship to a 
property requirement. 
Salinas argued the drainage fee was a user fee that was commensurate 
with the cost of providing the storm water service to those who elect to 
use the service.139  The fee was not imposed as an incident of property 
ownership or as a user fee for a property-related service.  Its theory was 
that a property owner could be exempt or have the fee proportionally 
reduced by maintaining a storm water management facility on the 
property or avoid the fee in its entirety by leaving the property in its 
natural state.  Thus, because an owner or occupier might own property 
without being subject to the fee or have it reduced by not fully utilizing 
the drainage system, the fee was not being imposed as an incident of 
property ownership. 
The court found that the storm water fee was a property-related 
service because it was closely tied to the physical properties of the 
parcel.140  The fee was tied to the physical properties of the parcel 
because developed parcels with larger impervious areas were charged 
more than those with comparably rain-absorbing parcels.  In simple 
terms, the court seemed to be saying that “if you own developed 
property, you have to pay the storm water fee” and that makes it directly 
related to property ownership.  The options of maintaining a storm water 
 
 136. Id. § 2(e). 
 137. Id. (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. § 2(h). 
 139. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230. 
 140. Id. 
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management facility on the property or securing a proportional reduction 
was characterized as misleading because “it suggests that the property 
owner can avoid the fee altogether by declining the service.”141  In its 
analysis, the court did not consider the possibility of avoiding the fee by 
leaving it in its natural state. 
In applying article XIIID, the court relied on the principle that words 
should be given their natural and ordinary meaning so as to effectuate 
the purpose of  proposition 218.  The voters had directed that “[t]he 
provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purposes of limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer 
consent.”142  To interpret the fee as a use-based fee, the court reasoned, 
would contravene the stated objectives of voters’ purpose as expressed 
in proposition 218.143  
The California Supreme Court decision in Apartment Ass’n of Los 
Angeles v. City of Los Angeles144 is fundamental to understanding the 
application of article XIIID.  It was the first decision by the California 
Supreme Court analyzing article XIIID, section 6.  The court held that a 
city-imposed fee on residential rental properties for the purpose of 
funding a program for the eradication of substandard housing was not 
subject to article XIIID, section 6.145  It reasoned that the challenged fee, 
which was imposed without meeting the noticing or voting requirements 
of article XIIID, was imposed on its subjects because of their business 
ownership, renting apartments, not because they were landowners.146  
The fee was more in the nature of business license charge than an 
exaction against the property because the fee was imposed only on those 
who engaged in the residential rental business.  In the words of the court, 
“[i]n this case, the relationship between the city’s inspection fee and 
property ownership is indirect—it is overlain by the requirement that the 
landowner be a landlord.”147 
The court reasoned that the plain meaning of article XIIID, section 6  
 
 141. Id. at 231. 
 142. Section 5 of proposition 218 provides: “Liberal Construction. The provisions 
of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local 
government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent.”  Proposition 218 § 5, 1996 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. Prop. 218 (West). 
 143. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231. 
 144. 14 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2001). 
 145. Id. at 937–40. 
 146. Id. at 937–38. 
 147. Id. at 938. 
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was “that it applies only to exactions levied solely by virtue of property 
ownership.”148  This language established a bright line test for assessing 
the voter approval requirements.  Thus, if the fee for storm water 
services is not imposed solely because the subject is a property owner, 
the voting approval provisions do not apply. 
There are several arguments that the Salinas decision wrongly applies 
section 6.  First, the court of appeal decision appears to be at odds with 
the supreme court’s test in Apartment Ass’n of Los Angeles that the fee 
be levied solely by virtue of property ownership.149  The storm water fee 
applies because the drainage activities from the property contribute 
storm water to the city’s storm sewer system.  The size of the fee relates 
to the type of use, the imperviousness of the surface, and the discharge 
to the storm sewer system, not to property ownership.  Another 
consideration militates against treating the fee as based solely on 
property ownership—not all property owners have to pay.  To the extent 
the property owner ceases to contribute storm water to the system, the 
fee is not applicable.  Thus, the fee seems more tied to the demand 
placed on the MS4 than on the property ownership. 
Second, the Salinas decision did not examine whether the storm water 
fee is based on an incident of property ownership.  Rather, it shifted the 
analysis to whether the storm water fee is a user fee or charge for a 
property related service. The court of appeal concluded that: “Resolution 
No. 17019 plainly established a property-related fee for a property-
related service, the management of storm water runoff from the 
‘impervious’ areas of each parcel in the City.”150 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the issue is determined by 
whether the fee is a “property-related service,” the public service is 
required to have a “direct relationship to property ownership.”151  To the 
extent that the service is indirectly related, the fee should not be deemed 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. The decision also appears at variance with the court of appeal’s decision in 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905 (Ct. App. 
2002).  The second district held that water rates established by Los Angeles were charges 
for water service based primarily on the amount consumed.  Id. at 908.  The rates were 
not fees for a property-related service, and thus the water rates were not subject to article 
XIIID.  Id.  This decision supports the view that storm sewer charges based primarily on 
the amount of service rendered or consumed would be exempt from voter approval.  The 
sixth district attempted to distinguish this decision by saying: “[t]his is not a charge 
directly based on or measured by use, comparable to the metered use of water or the 
operation of a business . . . .”  Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 231 (Ct. App. 2002).  No judicial authority supports the view that a 
user fee depends on the existence of a metering device. 
 150. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230. 
 151. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(h) (“‘Property-related service’ means a public 
service having a direct relationship to property ownership.”). 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
[VOL. 40:  245, 2003]  Municipal Storm Water Permitting 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 277 
property-related.  If indirectly related, this would mean that the issue 
must be analyzed under the controlling “incident of property ownership” 
clause because the subordinate “property-related fee” clause coverage 
does not cover all the possible fees and charges falling within the scope 
of article XIIID, section 6. 
As previously noted, the storm water fee is based on impervious 
surface area, which is used to calculate the proportional share of the cost 
to operate and maintain the storm sewer system.  Since the storm water 
fee is related to the amount of storm water runoff generated on the 
property, in the same way that the inspection fee in Apartment Ass’n of 
Los Angeles was related to the activity of renting, the amount of storm 
water contributed to the MS4 is at most indirectly related to the 
ownership of the property.  Because the fee can be avoided by not 
contributing storm water to the MS4 system, the fee arguably is 
indirectly related to property ownership.  As a result, the proper inquiry, 
which was not done by the court of appeal, is whether the fee is imposed 
solely as an incident of property ownership. 
If the term “incident of property ownership” is applied in a manner 
consistent with its ordinary meaning, the term would mean that the fee 
must be paid solely because the person owns property, and for no other 
reason.  This construction is consistent both with the Apartment Ass’n of 
Los Angeles decision and the focus of proposition 218 on the property 
ownership.  From this perspective, the storm water fee is related to the 
discharge and management of storm water from the property rather than 
being inseparably connected to property ownership. 
2.  Section 6(c) of Article XIIID: Exemption for Sewer,                      
Water, and Refuse Collection Services 
As noted above, the requirement for voter approval for new or 
increased fees and charges is subject to the following exception 
contained in section 6(c): “Except for fees or charges for sewer, water, 
and refuse collection services, no property related fee or charge shall be 
imposed or increased” without voter approval.152  To the extent that the 
storm water fee is for sewer or water services, it is exempt from the 
article XIIID voter approval requirement. 
As a matter of statutory construction, exemptions to the general 
purpose of the statute are strictly construed.  Furthermore, the one 
 
 152. Id. § 6(c). 
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seeking the benefit of the exemption must establish its application.153  
But these established principles operate within the confines of the words 
actually used, in this case by the voters, and is not a fishing license to go 
beyond those words.154 
Article XIIID does not define the term “sewer.”  The court of appeal 
in Salinas begins its analysis by finding the term “sewer” ambiguous or 
otherwise imprecise.  It then sought to resolve this difficulty by relying 
on voter intent. 
The starting point then is whether the term is in fact ambiguous or too 
imprecise.  Plaintiffs’ Taxpayers Association claimed that the exemption 
was inapplicable.  It argued that section 6(c) does not distinguish 
between the sanitary sewer system and the storm sewer system.  Section 
5(a) of article XIIID, as well as the city’s ordinance, distinguishes 
sewers from “drainage” systems,155 and thus, an ambiguity exists.156  
Plaintiffs then argued the constructional maxim that “if a statute on a 
particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision 
in another related statute indicates an intent [that] the provision is not 
applicable to the statute from which it was omitted.”157  The obvious 
purpose of the argument was to confirm the ambiguity and then to offer 
a narrow reading of the exemption, one that confined its application to 
sanitary sewers. 
In contrast, the city argued that the commonly accepted dictionary 
meaning of the term “sewer” includes both sanitary and storm sewers.158  
Thus, the reference is not ambiguous and the exemption applies to both.  
It supported its view that storm drains are simply a type of sewer by 
citing the Public Utilities Code,159 as well as the Salinas City Code.160  
 
 153. City of Lafayette v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 665 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 154. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Diego, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
804, 808 (Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 1999 Cal. LEXIS 5631 (Cal. Aug. 18, 1999): 
Proposition 218 provides it is to be liberally construed (Proposition 218, § 5).  
Liberal construction cannot overcome the plain language of Proposition 218 
limiting the scope of its assessments to assessments based on real property.  
Nor is there anything in the language of Proposition 218, or in the ballot 
arguments, that supports a conclusion Proposition 218 was intended to 
encompass assessments imposed in the 1989 Act. Nothing in the ballot 
arguments or language of the proposition would have alerted the electorate to 
such a construction. 
 155. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 5(a) (“Any assessment imposed exclusively to 
finance the capital costs or maintenance and operation expense for . . . sewers, water, 
flood control, drainage systems or vector control.”). 
 156. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232–
33 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 157. Id. at 232 (quoting In re Marquis D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 207 (Ct. App. 
1995)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 230.5 (West 1975) (“Sewer system” encompasses all 
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Other arguments were available, but not made.  The Government Code 
provisions on conveyance works in connection with sewer or drainage 
improvements inclusively refer to any sanitary sewer, storm sewer, or 
drainage improvements.161  Furthermore, numerous California cases 
have refused to distinguish between sanitary sewers and storm drains.162 
The court of appeal in Salinas found the term “sewer” ambiguous, and 
then resolved the constructional issue in terms of what most voters would 
have thought the term “sewer” to mean.  It reasoned,  “[t]he popular, 
nontechnical sense of sewer service, particularly when placed next to 
‘water’ and ‘refuse collection’ services, suggests the service familiar to most 
households and businesses, the sanitary sewerage system.”163  The voters’ 
intent, in the court’s opinion, was that the term “sewer” included only the 
sanitary sewer services, and therefore, the exemption did not apply. 
But the term “sewer” is not ambiguous.  This result was divined more 
by judicial fiat than by reference to any supporting evidence, such as that 
contained in the information pamphlet or other statements to the public 
accompanying proposition 218.  The failure to cite such evidence was 
understandable.  No such evidence was available.  The guiding principle 
 
property connected with “sewage collection, treatment, or disposition for sanitary or 
drainage purposes, including . . . all drains, conduits, and outlets for surface or storm 
waters, and any and all other works, property or structures necessary or convenient for 
the collection or disposal of sewage, industrial waste, or surface or storm waters.”). 
 160. The City of Salinas defines the term “storm drain” as “a sewer which carries 
storm and surface waters and drainage, but which excludes sewage and industrial wastes 
other than runoff water.”  Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232 n.6 (quoting SALINAS, CAL., 
CODE § 36-2). 
 161. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 23010.3 (West 1988). 
  Upon adoption of an authorizing resolution by the board of supervisors, in 
connection with the construction of any sanitary sewer, storm sewer, or 
drainage improvements, a county may expend any of its available funds for 
any additional cost of construction of any conveyance works in excess of the 
construction required for the current project . . . . 
Id. 
 162. See, e.g., Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 333 
P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1959) (citations omitted). 
  In Southern California Gas Company v. Los Angeles we stated that “In 
the absence of a provision to the contrary it has generally been held that a 
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied 
obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to 
make way for a proper governmental use of the streets. The laying of sewers is 
a governmental as distinct from a proprietary function under the foregoing 
rule.”  In this respect no distinction has been made between sanitary sewers 
and storm drains or sewers. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 163. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233. 
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of statutory construction to ascertain voter intent by turning to the words 
actually used by the electorate was brushed aside.  Courts should 
interpret and apply the words according to their ordinary meaning,164 
which the court of appeal failed to do. 
The court of appeal would have been well advised to recall the 
California Supreme Court’s warning on the slippery slope of voter 
intent: 
 We observed many years ago that even the most conscientious voters may 
lack the time to study ballot measures with that degree of thoroughness. Noting 
the tendency of voters to rely on the title to describe the content of an initiative, 
we agreed implicitly with the Supreme Court of Oregon whose observation we 
quoted: 
 “‘. . . The majority of qualified electors are so much interested in managing 
their own affairs that they have no time carefully to consider measures affecting 
the general public.  A great number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial 
knowledge of proposed laws to be voted upon. . . .  We think the assertion may 
safely be ventured that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or 
zealously oppose the passage of a proposed law initiated by petition who have 
attentively studied its contents and know how it will probably affect their 
private interests. The greater number of voters do not possess this information 
and usually derive their knowledge of the contents of a proposed law from an 
inspection of the title thereof, which is sometimes secured only from the very 
meager details afforded by a ballot which is examined in an election booth 
preparatory to exercising the right of suffrage.’” 
 Those observations are no less pertinent today.  “Voters have neither the 
time nor the resources to mount an in depth investigation of a proposed 
initiative.  Often voters rely solely on the title and summary of the proposed 
initiative and never examine the actual wording of the proposal.”165 
The court of appeal’s analysis was not informed by the CWA 
provisions on storm water regulation, which predate the adoption of 
article XIIID.  As the earlier discussion reveals, both sanitary sewer 
discharges and storm water discharges are subject to regulation as point 
sources for purposes of NPDES permitting.  The decision to treat them 
differently for purposes of applying article XIIID tends to undermine 
effective federal and state control by recognizing voter barriers to the 
management and control of storm water.  As a general matter, that 
 
 164. See People v. Knowles, 217 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1950). 
[The speculation brush cuts] with the pertinent question: what purpose did the 
Legislature seek to express as it strung those words into a statute? The court 
turns first to the words themselves for the answer. It may also properly rely on 
extrinsic aids, the history of the statute, the legislative debates, committee 
reports, statements to the voters on initiative and referendum measures.  
Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the purpose 
of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, 
reminders that whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly 
undertaken and not to be disregarded. 
Id. at 5. 
 165. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 
799 P.2d 1220, 1236 (Cal. 1990) (citations omitted). 
PRINTERMINAN.DOC 1/15/2020  4:28 PM 
[VOL. 40:  245, 2003]  Municipal Storm Water Permitting 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 281 
reasoning also ignores that low-flow storm water diversion facilities and 
structures, which divert storm water to the sanitary sewer system, are 
realities in many jurisdictions. 
The court of appeal’s reasoning produces a paradoxical result.  Both 
sanitary sewers and storm sewers carry waste that is harmful to public 
health, welfare, and safety.  Because sanitary sewer fees are exempt 
from the voter approval process, cities may be encouraged to require that 
storm water discharges be made to the sanitary sewer system in order to 
allow the cost of operation to be recovered by seeking safe harbor under 
the section 6(c) exemption.  But this type of unintended incentive may 
overload the sanitary system to the detriment of the public by 
necessitating expanded sanitary system capital improvements. 
The court of appeal also found that the exemption for “water 
service” applied only to the supply of water, not the disposal of storm 
water.166  It reasoned  “we cannot subscribe to the City’s suggestion that 
the storm drainage fee is ‘for . . . water services.’”167  After the adoption of 
proposition 218, the legislature enacted section 53750 of the Government 
Code to clarify some of the terms used in articles XIIIC and XIIID, 
including “water” which was not defined.  Section 53750 defines 
“[w]ater” as “any system of public improvements intended to provide for 
the production, storage, supply, treatment, or distribution of water.”168  
Thus, the average voter, in the court’s view, would envision the term 
“water service” as pertaining only to the supply of water for personal, 
household, and commercial use, not the provision of storm water 
services.169  This conclusion, at least when based on the average voter at 
the time proposition 218 was enacted, may be considered suspect 
because the legislative clarification occurred after the constitutional 
provision was adopted by the voters.  To the extent that the clarification 
is considered more in the nature of amending or changing the scope of 
the proposition, the legislative action would be impermissible because of 
its status as a constitutional amendment.170 
This concern to one side, there are several aspects to the legislative 
clarification of “water” services that suggest that this exemption actually 
 
 166. Some jurisdictions tie the storm water fee to water service, and the storm water 
fee may appear as a separate line item on a customer’s water and sewer bill.  See, e.g., 
SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 64.0408 (2001). 
 167. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). 
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encompasses the storm water system.  Traditional water service or 
supply is also linked to the storm water system.  Runoff from over-
watered lawns, car washing activities by homeowners, and countless 
other activities contributed water to the storm system.  Management fees 
for these activities seemed clearly tied to water services.  Moreover, to 
the extent that storm water is stored on a temporary basis, used for 
ground water recharge, treated through either on-site treatment facilities 
in the MS4 or low-flow diversion projects connected to the sanitary 
sewer system, or treated through the incorporation of wetlands into the 
MS4, the exemption might be considered consistent with the legislative 
clarification of water services.   
The California Supreme Court has declined to review the court of 
appeal decision in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas.  
Therefore, municipalities are left to cope with the decision as they search 
for a reliable funding source to allow them to comply with storm water  
requirements.  In doing so, there are several options available to affected 
local agencies. 
One option is to use a storm water fee that satisfies the noticing and 
voter approval requirements of article XIIID.171  Section (6)(c) requires 
approval by a majority vote of the property owners subject to the fee or, 
at the option of the fee imposing agency, by a two-thirds vote of the 
electorate residing in the affected area.172  This option will necessitate 
convincing the voters to support such a fee. 
A second approach, one which would obviate the need for voter 
approval, would meet the objections with the fee identified in Salinas.  
Basing the fee on impervious area made the fee property-related, and 
thus subject to voter approval.  The court of appeal stressed that the 
city’s storm water fee was not based on or measured by use of the storm 
water service provided.  It was not comparable to the metered use of 
water or the operation of a business.173  To the extent that a storm water 
fee is based on or measured by the ratepayer’s use of the MS4, then the 
voter approval requirements should not trigger section 6.  Thus, storm 
water consumption-based usage rates for using the MS4, which are 
basically commodity charges, would not fall within the scope of the 
voter approval requirement.174 
 
 171. Article XIIID contains noticing and hearing procedures applicable to new or 
increased fees and charges that are property related.  CAL. CONST. art XIIID, § 6(a).  
These are in addition to the voter approval requirements contained in section 6(c). 
 172. “Agency” is defined as any local government as defined in section 1(b) of 
article XIIIC.  Id. § 2(a).  The term “‘local government’ means any county, city, city and 
county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any other local or 
regional governmental entity.”  Id. art. XIIIC, § 1(b). 
 173. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231. 
 174. To comply with Salinas, the storm water rate structure should be correlated to 
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A third possibility, one which was not raised or considered in Salinas, 
would be to rely on the section 6(c) exemption for “refuse collection 
services.”  This possibility would be based on regulating the waste found 
in storm water.  Storm water regulation is premised on controlling the 
waste in storm water.  As previously discussed, much of the waste that 
finds its way into the MS4, such as trash, pesticides, and oils, fits within 
the term “refuse” that has not been otherwise properly disposed of or 
controlled.  Undoubtedly, basing a storm water fee on the refuse exemption 
would be challenged.  To the extent that the Salinas voter-intent test is 
used to ascertain the scope of the exemption, this argument may be 
difficult to sustain.  In addition, where refuse collection fees are mandatory 
on property owners, the fees are likely to be treated as a property related 
service subject to article XIIID requirements.  To the extent such fees 
are voluntary and can be avoided, the argument may be more persuasive. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the regulation of discharges of waste in 
storm water from municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s).  The 
effective regulation of urban storm water is a daunting challenge, one 
that is complicated by theoretical, economic, practical, and legal 
considerations. 
Unlike the sanitary sewer waste water, which is treated by a publicly 
owned treatment work (POTW) before being discharged, storm water 
usually is discharged to the receiving waters without the benefit of any 
treatment.  While it is theoretically feasible to combine sanitary and 
storm sewers or to treat storm water before it is discharged, full scale 
“end-of-pipe” treatment of storm water runoff is not considered 
economically or technologically feasible at this time. 
 
the services consumed by the ratepayer.  In structuring such a system, the analogy to the 
treatment of sanitary sewer rates, where water delivery is used as an approximation of 
the amount of wastewater the sewer customer discharges into the sewer system, might be 
useful.  A storm water flat rate for being connected to the water delivery system might be 
imposed.  The storm water fee could be tied to water use, not property ownership.  This 
approach would be useful where the water contributed to the storm water system or 
runoff was connected to delivered water. 
An alternate approach might be to base the fee structure on the amount of storm water 
runoff beyond that which would be contributed to the MS4 had the property been left in its 
natural state.  The advantage of this approach is that it stresses the election to voluntarily 
use the service.  While arguable as a matter of theory, it should be appreciated that Salinas 
rejected using impervious area, which is similar in approach, as a proxy for use. 
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In addition to technical and economic difficulties, practical constraints 
also exist.  Storm water is inherently diffuse and sporadic in nature.  
Both the volume and the velocity of the discharge depend on weather 
conditions.  Urbanization complicates the problem because the capacity 
of the soil to absorb precipitation depends on factors directly related to 
urbanization.  Urban development generally increases the amount of 
pollution in the runoff and decreases the opportunity for natural 
processes to reduce pollutant loads due to the increase of impervious 
surfaces.  These considerations make tracing storm water pollution to 
specific sources difficult, which further complicates the task of 
controlling it through regulation.  Creative approaches to effectively 
addressing the problems are needed. 
Finally, the problem of storm water regulation has been hampered, at 
least until recently, by regulatory inertia.  Several years ago, a 
commentator captured the problem of regulatory inertia when he 
observed: “Separate storm sewers are technically subject to the NPDES 
program [the Clean Water Act] but can be covered by general permits.  
For the most part, this means a free ride, with the burden on the 
regulators to revise the status quo.”175 
In California, regulatory inertia started to change in the early 1990s 
when regional water quality control boards began issuing the first round 
municipal storm water permits under the authority of the CWA.  
Progress accelerated with the turn of the millennia.  Since then, 
California has continued its leadership role in changing the status quo.  
The San Diego MS4 permit is at the forefront of California’s regulatory 
effort.  Thus, it is a useful vehicle to study some of the important legal 
issues associated with the regulation of the waste in storm water. 
The significance of the storm water problem to society is clear.  It is 
the leading cause of water quality both nationally and in California.  
Consequently, it should not be surprising that the era of timorous or lax 
regulation of urban runoff has passed.  But its passing has not occurred 
without legal and political controversy that is likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
 175. STENSVAAG, supra note 10, at 638 (quoting WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 2 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.31 (1986)). 
